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In formal (abstract and structured) argumentation
theory, a central notion is that of an attack between
a counterargument and the argument that it is chal-
lenging. Unlike the notion of an inconsistency be-
tween two statements in classical logic, this notion
of an attack between arguments can be asymmet-
ric, i.e. an argument A can attack an argument B
without B attacking A. While this property of the
formal systems studied by argumentation theorist
has been motivated by considerations about the hu-
man practice of argumentation in natural language,
there have not been any systematic studies on the
connection between the directionality of attacks in
argumentation-theoretic formalisms and the way
humans actually interpret conflicts between argu-
ments in a non-symmetric way. In this paper, we
report on the result of two empirical cognitive stud-
ies that aim at filling this gap, one study with ordi-
nary adults (undergraduate students) and one study
with adult experts in formal argumentation theory.
We interpret the results in light of the notions and
distinctions defined in the ASPIC+ framework for
structured argumentation, and discuss the relevance
of our findings to past and future empirical studies
about the link between human argumentation and
formal argumentation theory.
1 Introduction
The formal study of argumentation is an important field of
research within AI [Rahwan and Simari, 2009]. It consists of
two major branches: In abstract argumentation theory, intro-
duced by Dung [1995], one models arguments by abstracting
away from their internal structure to focus on the relations of
conflict between them. In structured argumentation theory,
one additionally models the internal structure of arguments
through a formal language in which arguments and counter-
arguments can be constructed [Besnard et al., 2014]. We use
the term formal argumentation theory to refer to both of these
branches of argumentation theory together.
Two prominent frameworks for structured argumentation
are the ASPIC+ framework [Modgil and Prakken, 2014] and
the ABA framework [Toni, 2014]. ASPIC+ defines different
kinds of attacks between arguments (rebuttal, undermining
and undercut), depending on whether the counterargument
challenges the conclusion of the attacked argument, a premise
used by the attacked argument, or a defeasible inference rule
applied in the attacked argument. Furthermore, ASPIC+ in-
corporates a notion of preference between arguments based
on a preference relation between the defeasible premises and
rules used in the arguments.
In classical logic, the inconsistency between two state-
ments is a symmetric relation, so that it gives rise to an undi-
rected notion of logical conflict. One of the central features of
formal argumentation theory that distinguishes it from classi-
cal logic is the presence of a directed notion of logical con-
flict, namely unidirectional attacks. For example, in ASPIC+,
an undercut (an attack on an inference rule applied in the at-
tacked argument) is always unidirectional, while a rebuttal
(an attack on the conclusion of the attacked argument) is bidi-
rectional unless there is a strict preference of the attacking
argument over the attacked argument.
It is still poorly understood to which extent the directed no-
tion of unidirectional attacks that is present in the formalisms
of argumentation theory is reflected in the way humans actu-
ally employ and evaluate natural language arguments. Two
questions can be asked here: Do humans systematically in-
terpret certain kinds of conflict in a non-symmetric, directed
way? And if yes, is there any correspondence between the
notion of directionality that humans employ when evaluat-
ing arguments and the criteria according to which structured
argumentation frameworks like ASPIC+ and ABA determine
the directionality of attacks? These questions have previously
not been systematically studied. This lack of understanding
puts applications of formal argumentation theory to natural
language argumentation on shaky grounds and makes it diffi-
cult to assess the value of such applications.
In this paper, we report on the results of two empirical cog-
nitive studies that address the questions mentioned above in
order to contribute to an increased understanding about the
nature of attacks between natural language arguments and
the directionality of such attacks. The results of our study
confirm that humans systematically interpret certain kinds of
conflict in a directed way, and suggest that the criteria accord-
ing to which ASPIC+ determines the directionality of attacks
are more in line with how humans evaluate arguments than
the corresponding criteria of ABA.
2 Preliminaries of Structured Argumentation
One important family of frameworks for structured argumen-
tation is the family of ASPIC-like frameworks, consisting
among others of the original ASPIC framework [Prakken,
2010], the ASPIC+ framework [Modgil and Prakken, 2014],
the ASPIC− framework [Caminada et al., 2014] and the
ASPIC-END framework [Dauphin and Cramer, 2017]. We
briefly sketch ASPIC+, as it is the basis for part of our analy-
sis of natural language argumentation.
ASPIC+ is a general framework that can be instantiated in
different ways, which means that it is flexible with regards to
the choice of the logical language to be used in the framework
as well as the set of inference rules that are admitted. An in-
stantiation of the ASPIC+ framework (called argumentation
theory) is given by a formal language L, a set of axioms over
L, a set of defeasible premises over L, a set of strict rules
and a set of defeasible rules. Arguments are built by applying
the rules to deduce new information from axioms, defeasible
premises or the conclusions of previous arguments. The ax-
ioms and strict rules constitute the deductive base logic under-
lying the argumentation theory, while the defeasible premises
and rules allow for defeasible arguments to be formed, which
might get rejected in the light of counterarguments.
An argumentA that is part of a bigger argumentB is called
a subargument of B. Note that any argument is considered a
subargument of itself. An axiom or a defeasible premise by
itself also constitutes an argument, which is a subargument to
any argument using this axiom or premise.
In ASPIC+, three kinds of attacks between arguments are
distinguished: Argument A undermines argument B iff the
conclusion of A negates a defeasible premise used in B. Ar-
gument A rebuts argument B iff the conclusion of A negates
the conclusion of a defeasible inference made within B. A
undercuts argument B iff the conclusion of A negates the
name of a defeasible rule used in B (which intuitively means
that A questions the adequacy of this defeasible rule).
Furthermore, the ASPIC+ framework allows to specify
a preference ordering between the defeasible premises and
rules, which gives rise to a preference order between argu-
ments. An undermining and a rebuttal is only considered
successful if the attacked argument is not preferred over the
argument that attacks it.
In ASPIC+, an argument can only be accepted if all of its
subarguments are accepted. For this reason, it makes sense
to consider the set of all subarguments of a given argument
A (including argument A itself) as a unit. This motivates the
following definitions:
We say that there is a conflict between two arguments A
and B iff some subargument of A (maybe A itself) attacks B
or some subargument of B (maybe B itself) attacks A. We
call a conflict between A and B bidirectional iff some subar-
gument of A attacks B, and some subargument of B attacks
A. A conflict that is not bidirectional is called unidirectional.
When there is no strict preference between A and B, a re-
buttal between A and B always gives rise to a bidirectional
conflict: If A rebuts B, there is always a subargument B′ of
B whose conclusion is negated by the conclusion of A, so
that A rebuts B′ and B′ rebuts A. Similarly, underminings
give rise to bidirectional attacks: When A undermines B by
negating a premise ϕ used in B, then ϕ by itself constitutes
an argument that rebuts A (or undermines A, if A is a simple
argument that just states a defeasible premise). So the only
way in which an attack from A to B can be unidirectional is
if either A undercuts B or some subargument of A is strictly
preferred to some subargument of B.
ASPIC+ is a formal framework which by itself says noth-
ing about natural language argumentation. However, the liter-
ature on ASPIC+ is full of examples of how to use ASPIC+ to
formally model the logical relationship between certain natu-
ral language arguments, and these examples were sometimes
used to motivate design choices of the ASPIC+ formalism.
Hence it is possible to extract predictions about the direction-
ality of attacks between natural language arguments that are
motivated by the definitions of ASPIC+. In Section 5, we will
explain the predictions that we made for the studies consid-
ered in this paper, and in Section 6 we explain and discuss the
results of our empirical studies concerning these predictions.
Another prominent framework for structured argumenta-
tion is the ABA assumption-based argumentation framework.
Due to space limitations, we will not describe ABA in any
detail, but just point out one important difference between
ABA and ASPIC+: In ABA, an attack from A to B is al-
ways based on a direct conflict between the conclusion of A
and an assumption of B. Despite some differences, assump-
tions in ABA work similarly to premises in ASPIC+, so that
the attacks of ABA correspond roughly to the underminings
in ASPIC+. But unlike in ASPIC+, these undermining-like
attacks can be unidirectional even in the absence of prefer-
ences. When considering types of attacks between natural
language arguments in Section 5.1, we will explain this dif-
ference between ASPIC+ and ABA with respect to the attack
type Simple Undermining.
3 Related Work
While formal argumentation theory is an important branch of
research within AI, only a few studies have empirically in-
vestigated the cognitive plausibility of the formalisms from
argumentation theory. The first of its kind is the study of
Rahwan et al. [2010], who tested how humans evaluate sim-
ple reinstatement and floating reinstatement. Their paper also
includes a discussion of why this kind of empirical valida-
tion of formalisms from argumentation theory is a highly
relevant method that complements the more widely applied
example-based and principle-based (or postulate-based) ap-
proaches. In order to test how humans evaluate simple and
floating reinstatement, they needed to formulate sets of natu-
ral language arguments that represent these two forms of re-
instatement. For this, there have to be certain unidirectional
attacks between the arguments, and – in the case of floating
reinstatement – also a bidirectional attack. One drawback of
their study is that the authors did not independently verify
whether the directionality of attacks that they intended for the
arguments that they designed coincide with how people inter-
pret these arguments. This drawback is especially pressing
in light of the fact that their “unidirectional” attacks directly
correspond to underminings in ASPIC+, which – as explained
in the previous section – actually give rise to a bidirectional
conflict in ASPIC+. For this reason, we have incorporated ar-
guments from Rahwan et al.’s studies in our studies, so as to
test whether the assumptions they make about the directional-
ity of attacks between natural language arguments correspond
to how humans evaluate these arguments.
Among the few additional empirical cognitive studies on
argumentation theory in the literature, one could noticeably
refer to the following three works: Cerutti et al. [2014] have
tested the correspondence between human evaluation of argu-
ments and properties of a logic-programming-based approach
to structured argumentation proposed by Prakken and Sar-
tor [1997]. Rosenfeld and Kraus [2016] have empirically
studied human argumentative behavior and compared it to
bipolar argumentation frameworks [Cayrol and Lagasquie-
Schiex, 2013]. Polberg and Hunter [2018] performed an ex-
periment to investigate the relation between human reasoning
on the one hand and bipolar and probabilistic approaches to
abstract argumentation on the other hand.
Despite the importance of the directionality of attacks in
the formalisms of argumentation theory, none of these studies
has explicitly studied how humans evaluate the directionality
of attacks between natural language arguments. The purpose
of the current paper is to fill this gap.
4 Hypotheses
In classical logic, all conflicts are symmetric, i.e. an asym-
metric kind of conflict like the unidirectional attacks ex-
plained in Section 2 does not exist in classical logic. While
unidirectional attacks play a crucial role in most formalisms
of argumentation theory, it is a priori not evident that this
feature of these formalisms corresponds to a cognitively real
phenomenon of human reasoning. If it does exist and has
any resemblance to its formal counterparts or to the motivat-
ing examples from the argumentation-theoretic literature, it
should be possible to design pairs of conflicting natural lan-
guage arguments A, B whose conflict is systematically inter-
preted by humans in a unidirectional way. This motivates the
following hypothesis:
H1. There are conflicts between arguments that are system-
atically interpreted by humans as unidirectional attacks in a
certain direction.
If unidirectional attacks correspond to a cognitively real
phenomenon of human reasoning, this does not necessar-
ily mean that the criteria by which humans judge conflicts
between arguments to be unidirectional rather than bidirec-
tional correspond to the criteria put forward by the develop-
ers of frameworks of structured argumentation like ASPIC+
and ABA. Indeed, as explained in Section 2, these two frame-
works do not coincide in their criteria for the directionality of
attacks in the case of underminings, so that we can be sure
that not both of them correspond to how humans actually rea-
son. This motivates the following two hypotheses:
H2. Humans evaluate the directionality of arguments accord-
ing to the same criteria by which ASPIC+ determines the di-
rectionality of attacks.
H3. Humans evaluate underminings as unidirectional, as
suggested by ABA.
5 Design of the Studies
Before we describe the studies that we designed in order to
test the three hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, we first need to ex-
plain what kinds of natural language arguments we used in
these studies, and how we categorized pairs of natural lan-
guage arguments depending on their attack type, i.e. the type
of attack relation that holds between them.1 This catego-
rization is strongly inspired by the distinctions made in the
ASPIC+ framework, but incorporates some additional dis-
tinction in order to account for properties of natural language
arguments that ASPIC+ does not account for.
5.1 Attack Types for Natural Language Arguments
Rebuttal without Preference. As explained before, in
ASPIC+ a rebuttal between two arguments, neither of which
is preferred to the other one, is always a bidirectional at-
tack. Our study includes pairs of natural language arguments
that were designed to stand in this symmetric relation to each
other: The conclusions of the two arguments directly contra-
dict each other, and there is no information in the arguments
that could justify preferring one of them over the other. We
call this attack type Rebuttal without Preference. Here an ex-
ample for this attack type:
A. A study that the Medical School of Harvard University
has published in 2013 corrects mistakes made in the study by
Gold et al. and concludes that only cyclic antibiotics can treat
Norovirus.
B. A study that the Institute of Bacterial Sciences of Oxford
University has published in 2013 corrects mistakes made in
the study by Gold et al. and concludes that only non-cyclic
antibiotics can treat Norovirus.
There is a contradiction between the conclusions of the two
arguments due to the words cyclic and non-cyclic.
Symmetric Undermining. As explained in Section 2, we
consider the sets of an argument and all its subarguments as a
unit. This allows for another kind of bidirectional conflict be-
tweenA andB, in which the conflict is only between a defea-
sible premise ofA and a defeasible premise ofB. In this case,
the subarguments of A and B that just state these premises
undermine each other. We call this bidirectional conflict be-
tween A and B Symmetric Undermining. Here an example
for this attack type from Rahwan et al. [2010]:
A. Cody is a rabbit. Therefore, Cody is not a bird.
B. Cody is a cat. Therefore, Cody is not a bird.
In this example, the world knowledge that nothing can
be both a rabbit and a cat is required to create a conflict.
While our studies include examples of Symmetric Undermin-
ing taken over from Rahwan et al. [2010], most of the in-
stances of Symmetric Undermining used in our studies are
arguments that we designed ourselves.
Simple Undermining. As explained in Section 2, when a
complex argument A (i.e. an argument that applies at least
one rule) undermines an argument B, a subargument of B
1The studies involved four attack types not listed below. Due to
space limitations and since we only collected small amount of data
for them, we do not report about them in this paper. However, the
general statements we make in this paper are all consistent with the
data we have collected on these additional attack types.
rebuts A, so that the conflict between the two arguments is
bidirectional in ASPIC+. But the corresponding arguments in
ABA are only in unidirectional conflict, so that here ASPIC+
and ABA give rise to different predictions about natural lan-
guage argumentation. We call this attack type Simple Un-
dermining. In Rahwan et al. [2010], all arguments that were
intended by the authors to be unidirectional were Simple Un-
derminings, e.g. the following one:
A. Cody is a bird. Therefore, Cody flies.
B. Cody is a rabbit. Therefore, Cody is not a bird.
Most of the instances of Simple Undermining included in
our study come from Rahwan et al. [2010], but we also in-
cluded some instances that we designed ourselves.
Attacking an Explicit Generic. In ASPIC+, the only way
to get a unidirectional conflict without preferences is through
undercutting, i.e. when an argument questions the adequacy
of a defeasible rule used in another argument. To design nat-
ural language analogues of this, one needs to specify what a
defeasible rule is in natural language argumentation, and how
a defeasible rule can be named in natural language so that
it can be attacked. One idea is to consider generic statements
like “Reindeer generally have antlers” as defeasible rules, and
to consider a statement like “It is not right to say that reindeer
generally have antlers” to be the negation of the name of this
rule. However, formalizing a generic as a defeasible rule is
not the only way to treat a generic in ASPIC+. It could also
be formalized as a premise that contains a defeasible condi-
tional. In this case, an attack on it would be an undermining
rather than an undercutting, and would give rise to a bidirec-
tional conflict. So we chose to call this attack type Attacking
an Explicit Generic, so that the name of the attack type does
not favor one of these interpretations over the other one. We
included this attack type in our study in order to test which
of these two interpretations corresponds better to how people
interpret the directionality of the attack in this case. Here is
an example of Attacking an Explicit Generic:
A. According to the Daily Mail, Prince William shot a rein-
deer yesterday. Reindeer generally have antlers. So Prince
William shot an animal that has antlers.
B. The website of the International Institute for Evolutionary
Biology explains that female reindeer generally don’t have
antlers. So it is not right to say that reindeer generally have
antlers.
Undercutting Trustworthiness of Source. A further idea
of how to represent undercuttings in natural language argu-
mentation is to consider the common inference step from a
statement that reports on some source S making some claim
ϕ to the claim ϕ itself as the application of a defeasible rule.
In this case, an argument applying this defeasible rule can be
undercut by questioning the trustworthiness of source S. We
call this attack type Undercutting Trustworthiness of Source.
Here an example for this attack type:
A. The European Phonetics Centre states that the 2003 En-
cyclopedia of Phonetics contains many erroneous assertions
and cannot be trusted.
B. The International Institute for the Advancement of
Phonology states that the institution running under the name
“European Phonetics Centre” is not a serious scientific insti-
tution, so its publications cannot be trusted.
Rebuttal with Preference by Specificity. A further way
in which unidirectional attacks can come about in ASPIC+
is by having a strict preference relation between two argu-
ments. ASPIC+ assumes a preference relation between de-
feasible premises and defeasible rules to be given, so it does
not give any predictions about what kind of natural language
expressions trigger a preference. However, in the literature on
non-monotonic reasoning and argumentation many examples
of preference have been considered, and one prominent case
is that of preference by specificity, according to which more
specific information has priority over more general (less spe-
cific) information. This kind of preference gives rise to the
attack type Rebuttal with Preference by Specificity:
A. Mary put Maxy in a large cage, so Maxy cannot escape.
B. Maxy is a tiny snake, so Maxy can escape through the
holes of its cage.
In this example, the information that Maxy is a pet was
previously provided, and A does not add any more specific
information about Maxy other than its location. B on the
other hand gives very specific information about what kind of
pet Maxy is, so that the rebuttal fromA toB is not considered
successful, and the attack is unidirectional.
Rebuttal with Preference by Recency. Another way of
specifying a preference that we tested in our studies is a pref-
erence based on the recency of a scientific source of infor-
mation. The idea is that statements based on more recent re-
search are preferred over statements based on older research.
This kind of preference gives rise to the attack type Rebuttal
with Preference by Recency:
A. Specimen A consists only of amylase. The 2003 Encyclo-
pedia of Biochemistry states that amylase is an enzyme. So
specimen A consists of an enzyme.
B. A peer-reviewed research article by Smith et al. from 2006
has established that amylase is not an enzyme. Therefore no
specimen consisting only of amylase consists of an enzyme.
Undercut-like Rebuttal with Preference by Recency. An
additional attack type that we designed with the intension of
it being a unidirectional conflict combines features of Under-
cutting Trustworthiness of Source and of Rebuttal with Pref-
erence by Recency. We call it Undercut-like Rebuttal with
Preference by Recency:
A. A peer-reviewed research article by Smith et al. from 2006
has established that amylase is not an enzyme. Therefore no
specimen consisting only of amylase consists of an enzyme.
B. A study that the Biology Laboratory of Harvard Univer-
sity has published in 2011 corrects mistakes made in the study
by Smith et al. and concludes that amylase is a biologically
active enzyme.
Here the conclusions of A and B are in conflict, so there
is a rebuttal between them. As B is based on more recent
research, it is preferred, so that the rebuttal fromA toB is not
successful. Additionally, the expression “corrects mistakes
made in the study” questions the trustworthiness of the source
of argument A as in an undercut from B to A.
No Attack. There is also the possibility of there not being
any conflict whatsoever between two arguments. In order to
check if our predictions about when this is the case are right,
we also included such argument pairs in our study. We call
this type of relation between arguments No Attack.
5.2 Methodology
One goal of our research was to test whether the hypotheses
hold independently of the level of expertise in formal argu-
mentation theory. Thus we conducted two empirical cogni-
tive studies: Study 1 involved participants who were totally
naive to formal argumentation theory, whereas Study 2 was
conducted with experts in formal argumentation theory. Note
that due to the different methodology of the two studies, we
do not intend to compare their results, but just to provide two
independent studies to test the hypotheses.
Study 1. Naive Adults. Twenty-seven undergraduate
students from the University of Luxembourg voluntarily par-
ticipated for a remuneration of 10e. They were individually
tested in a quiet room. The test consisted in a questionnaire
that lasted about one hour. For the test, we used the four
sets of four conflicting arguments that follow the floating
reinstatement structure from Rahwan et al. [2010], and we
additionally created thirty-six sets with the same structure
(i.e. corresponding to the same abstract argumentation frame-
work) and four sets with a different structure and different
number of arguments. (The list of argument sets that we
created is available at http://icr.uni.lu/mcramer/
downloads/2018_Bridging_Supplement.pdf.)
We varied the nature of the attack type between conflicting
arguments according to the nine categories described in pre-
vious section. Additionally, we favored variety throughout
our argument sets by referring to various contexts (e.g., pet
caring, hunting report, scientific publications, see previous
section for illustrations).
For the test, we did not actually present any argument setr
in its entirety to our participants, because we considered that
judging attack relations would not be a straightforward task
for non-experts. Rather, the participants were only shown two
arguments at a time, and had to make a judgment about the
acceptability of each of these two arguments. For this pur-
pose, we selected 150 pairs of arguments from the designed
argument sets and we divided them in three questionnaire ver-
sions of 50 items. We made sure that attack type categories
were balanced across the versions. Each version was solved
by a third of the participants.
Participants were instructed to judge for each argument in
each pair whether they accept it, reject it, or consider its sta-
tus undecided. They were explicitly told that they should not
base their judgment on their knowledge, but only on the con-
tent of the arguments, and that by default an argument should
be accepted, unless the other argument provides reasons to re-
ject it. With the help of an example, it was explained to partic-
ipants that non-conflicting arguments should both be accepted
(no attack, denoted A B). In another example, they were
instructed to consider both arguments undecided when there
is a symmetric conflict between them (in abstract argumenta-
tion theory, this corresponds to a bidirectional attack, denoted
A↔B). In a last example, they were shown two arguments
A and B such that B provides a reason to reject A, whereas
A does not provide reason to reject B (this corresponds to
a unidirectional attack from B to A, denoted A←B). They
were instructed to reject A and accept B in this case. In the
tasks that participants had to solve, the order of the argument
within the pairs was randomized across the items to avoid any
effect of ordering.
Study 2. Experts in Formal Argumentation Theory. To
create our sample of experts in formal argumentation the-
ory, we contacted all authors of the chapters of a recently
published scientific book about formal argumentation. All
of them are thus active scientists in the field. Fourteen ex-
perts agreed to respond to our online questionnaire, which
was a shortened version of the test that naive participants
solved. The expert questionnaire consisted in seventeen argu-
ment sets, representative of the forty that were used in Study
1, and including some fillers with another structure to avoid
any learning pattern. In this version, we presented to our ex-
pert participants the whole argument sets, not just pairs of
arguments, and instructed them to indicate all the attack rela-
tions they believed existed between the arguments, by ticking
the corresponding boxes. Similarly as in Study 1, the order of
the arguments within the sets was also randomized to avoid
ordering effect.
6 Results
Judgments made by the participants in Study 1 and Study 2
are reported (in percentage) in Table 1.
Study 1. Naive Adults. We analyzed naive adults’ sub-
jective judgment about a pair of arguments as a function of
the attack type. 99.5% of responses were of one of the four
forms “accept A, reject B”, “reject A, accept B”, “A and
B undecided” or “accept A and B”. By abstract argumenta-
tion theory these responses correspond to the cases “A→B”,
“A←B”, “A↔B” and “A B” respectively, which is how
we report the responses in Table 1. In 0.07% of the cases
the participants did not respond anything, and in 0.44% of
the cases, the response was “reject A, reject B”, which has
no correspondence in an argumentation framework with two
arguments, so we discarded theses responses. Our results re-
vealed that the preferred attack relation differed between the
attack types. Participants correctly dismissed in 83% of the
cases any attack relation when there was no objective con-
flict between the arguments. More importantly, the majority
of participants judged as bidirectional attacks argument pairs
consisting of Rebuttal without Preference, Symmetric Under-
mining, and Simple Undermining (respectively, in 65%, 67%
and 69% of the case). Conversely, they largely considered
as unidirectional attacks the other conflicting situations (see
Table 1). We conducted one-sample proportion tests that con-
firmed that all the preferred attack relations within each attack
type were significantly greater than the chance level (lowest
χ(1) = 34.241, all ps < .001).
Study 2. Experts in Formal Argumentation Theory. We
analyzed the judgment of experts in formal argumentation
theory about the attack relation between natural language ar-
guments as a function of the attack type. One-sample pro-
portion tests revealed that the most largely chosen attack re-
lation within each attack type was significantly greater than
the chance level (lowest χ(1) = 48.931, all ps < .001). Ex-
perts were excellent in dismissing non-conflicting arguments
(in 98% of the cases). Importantly, the preferred attack re-
lations were very similar to the ones chosen by naive par-
ticipants (see Table 1), except for one category (Rebuttals
ASPIC+ Study 1 (Naive) Study 2 (Experts)
Attack type prediction A→B A←B A↔B A B A→B A←B A↔B A B
Rebuttal without Preference A↔B 14% 65% 21% 0% 86% 14%
Symmetric Undermining A↔B 13% 67% 19% 5% 52% 43%
Simple Undermining A↔B 10% 16% 69% 4% 3% 42% 52% 3%
Attacking an Explicit Generic A←B 7% 81% 4% 7% 0% 86% 14% 0%
Undercutting Trustworthiness of Source A←B 11% 77% 4% 8% 23% 65% 0.4% 12%
Rebuttal with Preference by Specificity A←B 4% 65% 20% 11% 7% 60% 24% 10%
Rebuttal with Preference by Recency A←B 1% 56% 38% 6% 2% 36% 57% 5%
Undercut-like Rebuttal with Pref. by Recency A←B 7% 83% 4% 6% 0% 89% 11% 0%
No Attack A B 13% 3% 83% 2% 0% 98%
Table 1: Percentage of chosen attack relation in Study 1 and Study 2 as a function of the attack type. For the attack types designed with
the intention to be unidirectional, A←B indicates the intended direction of attack. For the other attack types, the distinction between A→B
and A←B is not meaningful, so a combined percentage is shown. The majority choice is highlighted in bold. Percentage is rounded to the
nearest unit, except in the case of values less than 1%, which are rounded to the nearest tenth of a unit. Dashed horizontal lines group the
attack types into three categories according to the predictions motivated by ASPIC+ (as explained in Section 5.1).
with Preference by Recency) for which experts mostly con-
sidered bidirectional attacks (in 57% of the case), while naive
adults tended to judge them as unilateral attacks (in 56% of
the cases).
7 Discussion of the Results
The methodologies from Study 1 and Study 2 were different,
so we cannot directly and rigourously compare results from
one study to the other. However, it is important to empha-
sise that we observed very similar tendencies (i.e., majority
choices) in the two studies. Except for one attack type, Study
1 and Study 2 thus showed consistent data. Taken together,
our results support H1 that it is possible to create conflict-
ing arguments that are largely (i.e. above 80%) considered as
unidirectional attacks by humans.
Hypothesis H2 by itself does not specify a correspondence
between the criteria by which ASPIC+ determines the direc-
tionality of attacks between formal arguments, and analogous
criteria for the directionality of attacks between natural lan-
guage arguments. Since H2 can only be evaluated in light of
such a correspondence, we here evaluate it based on the cor-
respondence described in Section 5.1. If H2 is interpreted in
this way, the data also confirm H2, since the majority judg-
ment generally coincides with the ASPIC+-based predictions
explained in Section 5.1, and since the majority judgment is
in all cases significantly greater than the chance level.
The only discrepancy from the ASPIC+-based predictions
is the expert judgment on Rebuttal with Preference by Re-
cency, but in light of the overall trends, this is best explained
by saying that most experts do not consider the recency of
a scientific publication cited in an argument as a valid crite-
rion for strictly preferring this argument. Note that of the two
possible interpretations for Attacking an Explicit Generic that
we provided in Section 5.1, the one that treats this attack type
as a type of undercutting is confirmed by the data, while the
interpretation that treats is as a type of undermining is dis-
confirmed, as participants interpret it significantly different
to Simple Underminings (in naive, χ(3) = 50.637, p < .001;
in expert, χ(3) = 9.938, p = .019).
Hypothesis H3 has been disconfirmed by our results: In
the case of Simple Undermining, ABA predicts a unidirec-
tional attack, while the majority judge it as a bidirectional
attack. However, according to a considerable minority of
judgments made by experts (42%), there is a unidirectional
attack from B to A in line with the ABA prediction, which
suggests that the ideas present in the ABA framework have
some reflection in the way experts (or at least a significant
minority of experts) judge this attack type. Note that since
Rahwan et al. [2010] presupposed that Simple Undermin-
ing was a unidirectional attack, our findings also suggest that
Rahwan et al.’s interpretation of their data is problematic and
should be reconsidered in the light of our findings.
8 Conclusion and Outlook
Our two studies with naive and expert participants confirm
our hypothesis that some conflicts between arguments are
systematically interpreted by humans as unidirectional at-
tacks. Furthermore, the studies suggest that the way the di-
rectionality between attacks is defined in ABA is problem-
atic, while they support the definitions in ASPIC+, as long
as generic statements are treated as rules that can be under-
cut rather than as premises that can be undermined. At the
same time, the fact that depending on the attack type, humans
agree with the predictions motivated by ASPIC+ to a vary-
ing degree, suggests that the distinctions made by ASPIC+
are not fine-grained enough to fully explain how humans at-
tribute directionality to conflicts between arguments.
Since the directionality of attacks is an important feature
of formalisms of argumentation theory, our research is highly
relevant to the ongoing endeavor to empirically validate these
formalisms. The interpretation of the results of existing stud-
ies like that of Rahwan et al. [2010] might have to be re-
considered in light of our findings. Future empirical studies
on argumentation theory can profit both from our results and
from the methodology of our studies in order to ensure that
participants generally evaluate the directionality of attacks in
the way intended by the designers of the study, which is a
prerequisite for studying other features of formal argumenta-
tion, e.g. the correspondence between certain argumentation
semantics and the way humans evaluate arguments.
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